In December 2014 the Court of Justice of the European Union found, in Opinion 2/13, that the Draft Agreement for the EU accession to the ECHR was not compatible with the Treaties; unfortunately, some of the grounds relied upon by the Court will be difficult to remedy in a new agreement, even should the other parties to the ECHR be willing to negotiate a new agreement. This contribution recalls the reasons why accession was deemed necessary, and engages in a critical analysis of the Court's ruling. In particular, it takes issue with the Court's approach to justice and home affairs, where the Court would like the accession agreement to somehow relieve the Member States of some of their ECHR obligation when giving effect to legislation based on 'mutual trust'. The article then suggests that the three political institutions should simply declare that they consider themselves bound by the ECHR and that they will act without delay when and if the European Court of Human Rights should find that a piece of Union law is incompatible with the Convention.
example, criminal, asylum, and immigration law, and sanctions against individuals).
It is therefore immaterial that the EU courts already protect fundamental rights: the ECHR is not aimed at ensuring primary protection -that is the role of domestic courts (and of the EU courts in the EU context). Rather, and this seems a nuance lost in the CJEU's understanding of the Convention system, the ECHR provides residual protection. Whilst it is certainly true that, like any other judicial actor, one might disagree from time to time with its interpretation of given rights, its function is unique and uniquely precious. In the EU context, some examples might well serve to illustrate the benefits of external scrutiny. Take for instance three distinct areas: the institutional structure of the EU; fundamental rights vis-à-vis integration bias; and the application of EU fundamental rights to national law.
In relation to the institutional structure of the EU, it is sufficient to recall the role of the Advocate General, which was questioned in the Kaba litigation. In the Kaba II case, the national court raised the question whether the fact that parties could not respond to the opinion of the Advocate General was compatible with Article 6 ECHR: 10 lack of rejoinder was compatible with Article 6(1) ECHR in some cases but not in others.
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The Advocate General delivered a very strong opinion rejecting the challenge, and given the obvious bias, not an entirely persuasive one. 12 The Court of Justice decided to reverse the order of the questions and did not adjudicate on the compatibility of the Court's own structure with the ECHR, even though that question was of absolute relevance both for the proceedings under consideration and for the judicial architecture of the European Union. It is clear that in cases such as this, and given the basic principle pursuant to which nobody (not even a court) should be adjudicating on its own affairs, external scrutiny would be beneficial to the EU and its credibility.
In relation to the integration bias, that is the fact that fundamental rights might be sacrificed on the altar of allegedly superior interests in pursuing and/or enhancing European integration, the need for an external scrutiny is all the more necessary when the EU legislates in the areas of criminal, asylum and immigration law. Here, take the reticence of the Court of Justice to engage with the reservations expressed by national courts on the European Arrest Warrant's compatibility with fundamental rights; 13 or its quasi-religious belief in the adequacy, from a fundamental rights perspective, of all 28 national legal systems; 14 or its variable case law on the extent to which national authorities, including the courts, are bound by the Charter when implementing EU law. 15 For instance, when fundamental rights act as a proxy for furthering integration, the Court seems quite eager to impose on national court an obligation to apply EU fundamental rights on acts of domestic institutions: that was the case in Carpenter, where a rather remote connection with the free movement of services was instrumental in imposing EU fundamental rights on national authorities; 16 In this case the ECtHR found that fact that the parties are not informed in advance of the submissions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement and that they cannot reply to those submission did not constitute a breach of Article 6. The ECtHR stressed that i) it was open to the parties to ask the CG to indicate the general tenor of his submissions; ii) that it was open to the parties to reply to the CG by means of a memorandum for the deliberations (para 76). Consider that in the case of the AG's opinion that is not possible. that failure to refer a question for preliminary reference impacts on the presumption of equivalence and therefore triggers the jurisdiction of the ECtHR also in relation to acts of Member States implementing EU law where there was no discretion left to national authorities (pure EU acts).
C. THE BROADER CONTEXT: LEADING BY EXAMPLE (OR NOT?)
The third reason why accession to the ECHR (and the adoption of the Charter) is considered necessary is to ensure some coherence between what the EU requires of acceding Member
States and international partners on the one hand, and its own behavior, on the other. Thus, starting from the mid-1990s, the scholarship has noted how the Copenhagen criteria, which impose fundamental rights compliance as a condition for accession, 38 as well as the increased use of human rights conditionality clauses in international agreements between EU and third countries, 39 was at odds with the EU's own behaviour in relation to fundamental rights. The
Charter, of course, goes a long way in addressing those objections, and yet the lack of external scrutiny on the EU's own fundamental rights record is of course, noted, not least since the case law of the CJEU on fundamental rights protection is variable. (alleged) common basis that is at the heart of the mutual trust (so dear to the Court) between Member States in relation to judicial co-operation; and it is this common basis that is the foundation for the European Arrest Warrant, and the Dublin II and Brussels II Regulations. Furthermore, it is this 'common basis' that justifies Article 7 TEU. After all, if the EU is a community of like-minded states insofar as fundamental rights protection is concerned, and if it is the existence of these common values that justifies EU coordinating action in the judicial sphere, then it is only right that Member States might face scrutiny over their fundamental rights record. 41 If this is so, if the EU demands fundamental rights compliance from its Member States even beyond fields that are harmonized or affected by EU law, then it appears inconsistent for the EU not to subject itself to external scrutiny. This is even more the case at a moment when the post-war drive for fundamental rights protection might be losing steam.
The EU accession to the ECHR would have then remedied those problems, as well as sending out a very important signal internally and internationally as to the centrality of fundamental rights protection for the integration project.
§3. THE DRAFT ACCESSION AGREEMENT
The Accession Agreement had to address two main problems: first of all, how to reconcile accession of a supranational body to a convention designed for states. In particular, 42 and
given the complexities and peculiarities of the EU legal architecture, it needed to ensure that (i) the competences of the EU would not be expanded through accession; 43 Secondly, the Court of Justice made it reasonably clear that it would not tolerate being deprived of the possibility of preliminary scrutiny over the compatibility with fundamental rights of EU law. 47 The Accession Agreement therefore needed to take this into account since the Court of Justice de facto had an indirect veto on the agreement, as it is for the Court to declare the compatibility of the latter with the Treaties (either in a preliminary opinion; or in direct or indirect challenges to the validity of the agreement).
The Draft Accession Agreement attempted to address these concerns through a carefully thought (if not perfect) mechanism. It therefore provided the following:
 Accession would impose obligations only in relation to acts, measures or omission of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and of persons acting on their behalf. It would not require the EU to perform an act for which it has no competence (Article 1(3)).
 Acts of the Member States should, for the purposes of the Convention, always be attributed to the Member States, even when adopted in the implementation of an EU act (or Treaty provision). In cases where the EU was a co-respondent, the EU could also be held responsible for a violation of the Convention (Article 1(4)). , available on www.ssrn.com; P Gragl 'The Reasonableness of Jealousy: Opinion 2/13 and EU Accession to the ECHR', available on www.ssrn.com. 50 The Court divided the issues in two categories: (i) 'whether the agreement envisaged is liable to adversely affect the specific characteristics of EU law (…) and (…) the autonomy of EU law in the interpretation and application of fundamental rights, as recognized by EU law and notably by the Charter' (emphasis added); and (ii) whether 'the institutional and procedural machinery' envisaged in the agreement ensures that the 'conditions in the Treaties for the EU's accession to the ECHR are complied with' (Opinion 2/13 para 179 Contracting Parties (if they wish they may provide a more generous protection). It does not provide an obligation. There is therefore no possibility of clash between the two Articles.
The same concern towards ensuring that in matters falling within the scope of EU law national courts do not get 'confused' over which standard of protection is applicable is visible in the Court's objection to Protocol 16 ECHR which allows the national highest courts and tribunals to request an advisory opinion from the ECtHR. In the eyes of the Court, and even though the Protocol was not part of the Accession Agreement, the possibility to request an advisory opinion might interfere with the national courts' duties to request a preliminary reference. 55 The Court fears that in cases falling within the scope of EU law, where the ECHR and the Charter would apply concurrently, national courts might be tempted to require an opinion from the ECtHR rather than a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice.
The objection to Protocol 16 however seems moot if one considers that the power of the national highest court to request an advisory ruling is a discretion which therefore should not, pursuant to the principle of loyal cooperation and Article 267 TFEU, be exercised at the expense of the CJEU's jurisdiction. 56 Furthermore, realistically, it is not clear what interest would a national highest court have in requesting an advisory opinion from the ECtHR, rather than a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. The latter will presumably continue to be speedier; it provides for the possibility to request an interpretation of the EU provisions in question beyond their compatibility with fundamental rights; and it might yield to a more satisfactory result given that the Court of Justice is, and would continue to be also after accession, the only court which might declare an act of the EU institutions invalid.
B. EU EXCEPTIONALISM
Secondly, and perhaps more worryingly, the Court demands that any draft agreement should provide for some sort of EU exceptionalism, i.e. some special treatment of the EU. 57 Here the 55 This of course raises the question as to whether the duty of loyal co-operation might not impose on Member States the obligation of non-ratification of the Protocol in its current form. 56 In fact a deep distrust of national courts is also apparent in the mechanism (demanded by the Court) through which the European Court of Human Rights would give sufficient time to the CJEU to decide on compatibility of the EU act under consideration with the Convention in cases in which it had not done so previously. States may be required not only to presume compliance, but also to avoid checking in specific cases whether fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU have actually been observed. 58 The
Court then continued:
The approach adopted in the agreement envisaged, which is to treat the EU as a State and to
give it a role identical in every respect to that of any other Contracting Party, specifically 
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The reason for the Court's closure can be easily explained having regard to the peculiarities of some of the legislation adopted in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In particular, instruments like the European Arrest Warrant, the Dublin II Regulation and the Brussels II Regulation, aim to coordinate the legal systems of the Member States in order to ensure a speedier resolution of claims which have some cross-border connection. In relation to those British Conservative party challenges the need for the external scrutiny performed by the European Court of Human Rights. In their view, following the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Court of Human Rights would become an 'advisory body'; fundamental rights would only be able to be used in the more serious matters (a threshold mechanism) and should those changes not be acceptable to the Council of Europe, then the UK would 'be left with no alternatives than to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights'. In many ways, the Conservative Party's objections are not so different from the approach of the CJEU, and so not surprisingly Mr Chris Grayling, the current Justice Secretary, has welcomed Opinion 2/13, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-xxix/21909.htm. 58 Opinion 2/13, para. 192. 59 Opinion 2/13, para 193, emphasis added. 60 Opinion 2/13, para. 194 (emphasis added).
instruments, the CJEU has carved an exception to its case law on fundamental rights protection: if EU fundamental rights must always be applied to national acts implementing or giving effect to EU law, that is not the case in relation to coordinating instruments. Rather, national courts, in order to preserve the effectiveness of EU law might be under a duty not to perform a fundamental rights scrutiny, 61 or to limit such scrutiny to the most extreme of violations.
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This approach is justified, in the eyes of the Court, by the 'high degree of confidence which should exist between the Member States'. 63 Thus, the national court that is executing a European Arrest Warrant must presume that fundamental rights will be respected by the issuing authorities; the same applies to a national court which is enforcing a ruling under the Brussels II Regulation, 64 and, more controversially, in relation to decisions returning asylum seekers to their first port of entry. It is in relation to the latter category -asylum seekers -that the presumption of fundamental rights compliance has come under strain through the intervention of the ECtHR.
In particular, in the case of M.S.S., 65 the ECtHR found that since there is a reserve of sovereignty whereby a Member State can always decide to assess an asylum request, even when it is not a designated authority under the Regulation, the Convention applies to the exercise of that discretion. In other words, whenever a Member State returns an asylum seeker to another Member State under the Dublin II system, it has to consider whether the asylum seekers' Convention rights would be breached. Whilst the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that Member States might be satisfied that the responsible Member State 'apparently' complies with the Convention, 66 'the States must make sure that the intermediary country's asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylumseeker being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without any evaluation of the risks he faces from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention'. 67 In the ruling in Tarakhel, 68 the ECtHR further extended the Convention obligations of the Member States when applying the Dublin II Regulation. In that case, the Court found that in a case relating to a family with six children, Switzerland was under a Convention obligation to seek assurances from Italy (the port of first entry) that the family would be kept together and accommodated in a manner suitable to the age of the children.
The Court of Justice has given a narrow interpretation of the M.S.S. obligation to ensure that Convention rights would not be breached by the Member State responsible to assess the asylum application. In the N.S. ruling, after having reiterated that the entire point of the Dublin II system is to ensure a speedy resolution of asylum claims (and to avoid forum shopping), the CJEU limited the obligation of Member States to assert jurisdiction over asylum claims of individuals who could otherwise be returned to another Member State to circumstances in which:
there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State.
can really be relied upon in order to justify rules which might have a significant impact on the rights of individuals, as protected by the Charter as well as the Convention.
In this respect, the presumption of minimum fundamental rights compliance appears to be based more on legal fiction than on facts: 70 concerns as to fundamental rights compliance. Thus, Article 7 TEU, due to its inherently political nature, appears not apt to guarantee that basic uniformity that should be the foundation upon which mutual trust can be built.
In relation to the potential to compel Member States to respect fundamental rights, it should be noted that EU fundamental rights apply only when Member States are implementing EU law, therefore rendering an action for infringement difficult (albeit not impossible).
Moreover, and even though there are sectorial pieces of legislation which touch upon human rights (such as the non-discrimination directives), 76 infringement proceedings for quite blatant violation of discrimination rules in relation to the Roma population have been slow to come.
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Thus, if there is no effective way to monitor fundamental rights compliance in the EU, why should mutual trust be elevated to a 'supreme' interest/principle in human rights-sensitive areas? This is not the internal market, where it is reasonable to expect that since Member
States have little interest in putting their citizens at risk, they might be trusted to do a reasonable job at regulating the market. 78 In the field of criminal law, and even more so in the fields of asylum and immigration, measures are, usually, adopted against the weakest and most disenfranchised individuals: the presumption of fundamental rights compliance therefore seems naïve at best.
For these reasons the 'mutual trust' objection is particularly worrying: first, because it seeks to remove the basic net of fundamental rights protection provided for in the ECHR, where it is needed the most. Secondly, because it is difficult to accommodate in a new Accession Agreement (on this point see further below). States.

The mechanism for the involvement of the CJEU. Here, the Court objected to two issues: first of all, the decision on the need for the involvement of the CJEU should rest with an EU institution and not with the ECtHR. Secondly, the agreement (or the interpretation thereof provided in the draft explanatory report) seems to exclude the possibility of consulting the CJEU on matters of interpretation of secondary legislation, therefore allegedly breaching the principle that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of EU law.
§5. THE FUTURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION WITHOUT

RATIFICATION OF THE ECHR
It is interesting to note that most of the Court's objections relate to jurisdiction that the European Court of Human Rights already exercises. Thus, and as recalled above, the ECtHR already imposed some obligations on the exercise of discretion by the Member States in cases involving asylum seekers. 83 It has also already been clarified that the presumption of equivalent protection does not apply at all when the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction, so that acts adopted within the context of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy can presumably be attacked in front of the ECtHR. 84 Furthermore, the ECtHR has made it clear that the refusal to refer a case to the CJEU must be adequately reasoned or else there would be not only a breach of Article 6(1) ECHR but also a rebuttal of the presumption of equivalent protection. It is to be hoped then that, pending the resolution of the stalemate created by Opinion 2/13, the European Court of Human Rights will be willing to protect fully the rights of those subject to EU rules, and, indeed, there are already indications that this might be the path that will be taken. Thus, Dean Spiellmann, the President of the ECtHR, commenting on Opinion 2/13 made his disappointment at the ruling clear, and indicated that the ECtHR will step in to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights for EU citizens. He stated:
For my part, the important thing is to ensure that there is no legal vacuum in human rights protection on the Convention's territory, whether the violation can be imputed to a State or to a supranational institution.
Our Court will thus continue to assess whether State acts, whatever their origin, are compliant with the Convention, while the States are and will remain responsible for fulfilling their Convention obligations. For, let us not forget, if there were to be no external scrutiny, the victims would first and foremost be the citizens of the Union. 85 In this respect, it should be noted that the Bosphorus doctrine is sufficiently flexible to allow for meaningful protection in pure EU law cases, i.e. in those cases where individuals are challenging acts of Member States adopted in order to implement a EU act (with no discretion left to the Member State), even without disposing of the doctrine of equivalent protection. After all, it would be sufficient for the European Court of Human Rights to give a slightly broader interpretation of what constitutes a manifest breach of the Convention.
As for the EU, the latter's political institutions (and its Member States) could decide to make a clear and unambiguous commitment to fundamental rights, without entering in a direct collision course with the CJEU. 86 It might be recalled that in 1977 the Commission, the This would send a very important signal to our international partners as to the EU commitment to fundamental rights protection. Even if for the time being, the EU is not in a position to formally accede to the ECHR, nothing prevents it from deciding that it would consider itself bound by the Convention and by the rulings of the ECtHR. The ensuing situation might even be preferable to Accession, as in many ways simpler from a practical and constitutional viewpoint; at a stretch it could be argued that such an arrangement, albeit informal, would satisfy the obligation in Article 6(2) TEU.
